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We introduce a prototype agent-based model of the macroeconomy, with a budgetary constraint
at its core. The model is related to a class of constraint satisfaction problems, which has been
thoroughly investigated in computer science. We identify three different regimes of our toy economy
upon varying the amount of debt that each agent can accumulate before defaulting. In presence of a
very loose constraint on debt, endogenous crises leading to waves of synchronized bankruptcies are
present. In the opposite regime of very tight debt constraining, the bankruptcy rate is extremely
high and the economy remains structure-less. In an intermediate regime, the economy is stable
with very low bankruptcy rate and no aggregate-level crises. This third regime displays a rich
phenomenology: the system spontaneously and dynamically self-organizes in a set of cheap and
expensive goods (i.e. some kind of “speciation”), with switches triggered by random fluctuations
and feedback loops. Our analysis confirms the central role that debt levels play in the stability of
the economy.
I. INTRODUCTION
Neo-classical economics, based on the idea of fully rational representative agents who optimize their intertemporal
utility function, held a hegemonic position in academic and institutional circles for years until its serious shortcomings
were brutally brought to the fore during the crisis of 2008. Calls for “rebuilding macroeconomics” can be heard across
the board (central banks, IMF, OECD, and of course university economics departments) [1, 2].
Once one abandons the straitjacket of rational expectations, so many possibilities open up that the modelling
endeavour seems hopeless to many – as Sims and Sargent noted, abandoning rational expectations leads a modeler
into the “wilderness of bounded rationality” [3, 4]. There is another way to look at how research should be conducted,
though, which turns the “wilderness” predicament on its head. Unshackled by the immediate necessity of logical
consistency and direct empirical relevance, modelers can explore new ideas that suggests explanations for real world
phenomena that are unfathomable within the context of classical approaches. One of the most baffling such so-called
“anomalies”, is the “excess volatility” puzzle (also called “small shocks, large business cycle” puzzle) [5–8]: fluctuations
of both economic activity and financial prices seem way too large to be accountable by “dynamic stochastic general
equilibrium” models (DSGE).
The understanding and modeling of the phenomena that can emerge beyond general equilibrium should benefit
from the remarkable progress made in other fields (physics, computer science, ecology, etc.) in the understanding
of “complex systems”. One came to realize that non-linear, interacting units can lead to a variety of interesting
phenomena, like phase transitions [9–12], complex sustained endogenous dynamics and synchronisation effects [13, 14],
history dependence [15], intrinsic fragility and sudden breakdown [16, 17], to name a few. It is difficult not to think
these effects, that all show up in socio-economic systems, are governed by some of the general mechanisms present
in complex systems [18, 19] (for recent reviews see e.g. [17, 20]). This view has of course been held by many authors
since the famous 1987 Santa Fe conference “Economics as a complex evolving system” [21]. But for some reason,
these ideas have not really made it yet to the mainstream. Still, the study of “Agent Based Models” (ABM) to
understand economic systems has been booming in the last ten years, with many complex systems ideas finding a
natural framework to express themselves [12, 22–26].
Among the most important, overarching models of complex systems are the so-called “Constraint Satisfaction
Problems” (CSP). In a nutshell, these problems contain a certain number of variables (for example binary variables)
that must satisfy certain linear or non-linear constraints, like equalities or inequalities. K-SAT problems, for example,
require N binary variables to simultaneously satisfy M logical clauses, each clause containing K variables [27].
Typically, such problems have solutions when the number of clauses M is sufficiently small compared to the number of
variables (SAT phase), but run into contradictions when M is too large (UNSAT phase). Interestingly, the transition
between these two regimes becomes sharp in the limit N,M → ∞ with α = M/N fixed [28]. Furthermore, the
landscape of solutions becomes extremely complex in the SAT region close to the phase transition: solutions become
rare, and are clustered in disconnected “regions” of the variables’ space [29, 30]. Some of these clusters may suddenly
disappear as M increases, forcing the system to re-adapt in a completely different configuration – a crisis of sorts.
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2Since economic problems very often involve several types of constraints, such as budget constraints, leverage con-
straints or non-substitutability effects, we believe that the CSP paradigm should lead to important modelling insights
in economic situations as well. The aim of the present paper is to explore this idea in a very simple setting: a
market of goods with producers and consumers. Agents in the economy have to satisfy budget and/or production
constraints, and they adjust their strategies to optimize their profit while satisfying these constraints. Formally, our
model is identical to the so-called “perceptron model”, another classical and well studied CSP (see section II F below)
which can show multiple equilibria in certain regions of parameter space [31]. However, in this work we consider a
regime where there is always a single equilibrium to the perceptron problem. Still, as we will show, our CSP-inspired
macroeconomic ABM displays many interesting features, such as phase transitions, speciation, endogeneous business
cycles, etc. We also believe that this model opens the way to investigate more complex variants, which could in
principle display even more interesting phenomena such as multiple equilibria.
II. THE ECONOMY AS A CONSTRAINT SATISFACTION PROBLEM
In our model, we consider M agents and N products with prices p1 . . . pN . Each agent, labeled by µ = 1 . . .M
wants to buy or sell a certain quantity ξiµ of the product i (positive for selling the product and negative for buying
it). We normalize the prices such that at all times 1N
∑
i pi = 1 and that all prices are bounded from below pi ≥ xm,
where xm is a non negative real number, possibly zero. The evolution of prices is given by a “market” that attempts
to enforce simple budgetary constraints for all agents, while the evolution of preferences is decided by the agents
according to a simple behavioral rule, as we now describe.
A. Budget constraint and formation of prices
The quantity piµ =
∑
i ξ
i
µpi is the total money that the agent µ is willing to spend (or earn) in the market in a
given round. This quantity is subject to a budget constraint, namely that piµ ≥ σ. Here, σ < 0 if the agent is allowed
to borrow to cover losses and σ > 0 if the agent is required to make a profit. The products prices pi thus depend
dynamically on agents’ preferences. Given the matrix of preferences ~ξµ, we assume that prices are determined by the
market, in such a way that the least number of agents have unsatisfied budgetary constraints. We define a variable
called the “gap” as follows:
hµ(~p) := ~ξµ · ~p− σ > 0 ∀µ ∈ {1 . . .M} . (1)
The gap variable hence encodes the distance from the configuration where the budgetary constraint for agent µ is on
the verge of being unsatisfied (hµ = 0). The price vector ~p is then determined by minimizing the number of agents
whose constraints are unsatisfied. This can be achieved by minimizing the following cost function:
H(~p) =
1
2
M∑
µ=1
h2µ Θ(−hµ) , (2)
under the constraints that 1N
∑
i pi = 1 and pi ≥ xm, where xm is a small positive number thus ensuring that all
prices are positive. The Heaviside Θ function is equal to 1 when its argument is positive, and zero otherwise. This
function (or Hamiltonian) takes its minimal value (i.e. zero) when all agents are satisfied and is positive if at least one
agent is unsatisfied. In what follows, we use the formulation “unsatisfied agent” to mean that the agent’s budgetary
constraint is presently unsatisfied.
Note that the constraint on prices 1N
∑
i pi = 1 sets the price units. Since it is a linear constraint, the above
optimisation problem is convex and the solution space remains connected. This is no longer the case for other types
of constraints, for example 1N
∑
i(pi − p0i )2 = 1 where p0i are some reference prices (as considered in [32], see also
section II F) or 1N
∑
i |pi−p0i | ≤ Γ (corresponding to repricing costs). In such cases, one may anticipate an even richer
phenomenology, but we will not consider them further in the present study.
B. Preferences update: supply and demand
Agents’ preferences ~ξµ are allowed to evolve in reaction to supply/demand imbalances and prices, according to a
simple behavioral rule similar to that used in the “MarkI” and “Mark0” models [12, 33]. Contrary to the infinite
3horizon, profit maximizing framework which is de rigueur in standard microeconomic models, we posit reasonable,
heuristic rules to model the behavior of agents. These rules take the following form:
• Supply side. If the agent is a supplier for product i (ξiµ > 0), then it adapts as a function of the mismatch
between the supply Si and demand Di of product i, defined as:
Si =
∑
µ
ξiµ Θ(ξ
i
µ) , Di =
∑
µ
ξiµ Θ(−ξiµ) . (3)
The supplier updates their preference as:
Si > Di =⇒ ξiµ(t+ 1) = ξiµ(t)(1− Du) ,
Si < Di =⇒ ξiµ(t+ 1) = ξiµ(t)(1 + Du) ,
(4)
where u is a random number sampled independently from the uniform distribution on [0, 1], and D is the speed
of adjustment to supply-demand pressure.
• Demand side. If the agent is a buyer for product i (ξiµ < 0), it adapts its preferences looking at the relative
price level for the product as follows:
pi > 1 =⇒ ξiµ(t+ 1) = ξiµ(t)(1− P u) ,
pi < 1 =⇒ ξiµ(t+ 1) = ξiµ(t)(1 + P u) ,
(5)
where once again u is sampled independently from the uniform distribution and P denotes the speed of adjust-
ment to price pressure.
C. Transactions, production costs and redistribution
Agents then perform transactions, which determines the actual amounts of products sold and bought. The update
rules depend on the ratio of supply and demand for product i, noted ζi =
Si
Di
. If ζi > 1, then the suppliers in the
market are unable to dispose off all their inventory and sell only a fraction of it. Conversely if ζi < 1, then the
buyers are unable to satisfy their demands for product i. These transactions are encoded in the matrix of realized
supply/demand ξ¯iµ, which takes the following form:
ζi > 1, ξ
i
µ > 0 =⇒ ξ¯iµ =
ξiµ
ζi
,
ζi < 1, ξ
i
µ < 0 =⇒ ξ¯iµ = ζiξiµ .
(6)
The matrix ξ¯iµ hence enters the computation of the true money exchanged by the agents.
We posit that each product has a production cost γi associated with it, paid by all the suppliers of product i
and sampled from a uniform distribution [0, γ]. The production cost of all goods in the economy is redistributed to
the agents as wages. We define the total production cost as W (t) =
∑
µ,i γiξ
µ
i (t) Θ(ξ
i
µ(t)). This is then uniformly
distributed to all agents with each agent getting w = WM back as “wage”.
The “full” profit (or money exchanged) at time t by agent µ thus reads:
p¯iµ(t) =
∑
i
ξ¯iµpi(t)−
∑
i
γiξ
µ
i Θ(ξ
i
µ) + w(t) , (7)
where the first term corresponds to transactions, the second to production costs, and the third to the wage. Note that
because of the “market clearing” condition,
∑
µ ξ¯
i
µ = 0, we have
∑
µ p¯iµ(t) = 0, so that the total amount of circulating
money is conserved. Note also that the production cost and wage terms, on average, compensate each other. This is
the reason why we do not take them into account in the price formation process described in section II A.
D. Removal and Replacement of agents
At the end of these steps, it is possible that there exist agents whose budget constraint is unsatisfied. The economic
interpretation of an unsatisfied agent is straightforward: the agent cannot participate in the economy and should
4in principle go bankrupt and be removed. However, instead of looking at the instantaneous value of the constraint
(which could be sensitive to random local fluctuations), we impose that the budget is satisfied on average over some
time window.
More precisely, we take an exponentially moving average of the money that agents exchange and compare it to their
budget. We define piemaµ (t) which is the averaged money exchanged over multiple time steps (over a duration of the
order of ω−1):
piemaµ (t) = ωp¯iµ(t) + (1− ω)piemaµ (t− 1) . (8)
The agent µ is then removed if piemaµ (t) < σ and replaced by a new agent. The new agents’ preferences
~ξµ are sampled
independently from the Normal distribution N (0, 1). We also initialize piemaµ for the new agent with the average p¯iµ
of the remaining surviving agents. Note that while the average profit over all agents is zero, as discussed above,
the average profit of surviving agents can be non-zero and typically positive, because the distribution of profits of
surviving agents is biased towards the positive values. Note that when ω = 1, agents violating their budget constraint
are immediately removed.
E. Summary of the parameters
With the dynamical rules above, our model thus has the following parameters:
1. α = MN : the ratio of the number of agents to the number of products
2. σ: which is the budgetary constraint
3. D, P : susceptibilities of the agents to demand and price pressures
4. γ: parameter of the uniform distribution which fixes the production cost of the products
5. ω−1: timescale over which the agents’ average profit is computed.
The model is completely specified once these parameters are provided along with the initial distributions for the price
vector ~p and agents’ preferences ~ξµ.
F. Relation to the perceptron model
The Hamiltonian in Eq. (2) is formally identical to that of the so-called perceptron model, as formulated e.g. in
Ref. [31]. The perceptron is a classic machine learning problem: it was one of the first formal models of how neurons
function, and has been the object of study for many decades. Starting with the pioneering work of Rosenblatt [34], it
has continued to be both a paradigm and a cornerstone of machine learning. Statistical physicists became interested
in the perceptron problem and significant progress was made in the late 1980s in a series of papers [35–39]. Recently,
interest in the perceptron surged again within the physics community after Franz and Parisi proposed it as a toy model
to understand the jamming of hard spheres (see [31] for a detailed discussion). In the simplest setting, the disorder
(agents’ preferences ~ξµ here) is considered as quenched, while the variables are encoded in the vector ~p living on the
N -dimensional hypersphere. The models are then studied in the thermodynamic limit with a Hamiltonian equivalent
to Eq. (2). With the imposition of the spherical constraint on ~p, the perceptron problem becomes non-convex for
negative σ and a rich phase diagram is obtained [31]. In this work however, agents’ preferences evolve as price changes
and hence we do not work with quenched disorder, but time dependent (annealed) disorder. Furthermore, we impose
a linear constraint and a positivity constraint on the price vector, which makes the optimisation problem convex. As
mentioned above, non linear generalisations would be interesting to study further, along the lines of [32].
III. RESULTS
In this section, we present the results obtained through numerically simulating the dynamics of the model. In
what follows and unless otherwise noted, we set N = 100 products, α = 10 (i.e. M = 1000 agents), P = 0.05 and
5−1.75 −1.50 −1.25 −1.00 −0.75 −0.50 −0.25 0.00 0.25
σ
0.2
0.4
〈z〉
Mean
Min
Max
−1.75 −1.50 −1.25 −1.00 −0.75 −0.50 −0.25 0.00 0.25
σ
0.0
0.2
0.4
〈zema〉
Mean
Min
Max
FIG. 1: Behavior of thermodynamic variables as a function of σ: 〈z〉 and 〈zema〉. Also represented are the maximum
and minimum values attained during the simulation.
D = 0.05. Agents’ preferences ~ξµ are sampled from a standard normal distribution and the initial distribution of the
prices is taken from the uniform distribution [0, 2], such that the average is one1.
We further fix ω = 0.2 and γ = 1.0. We have explored numerically other parameter values. In fact, most of these
parameters turn out to play a minor role and do not change the qualitative behaviour of the model, except for the
level of allowed debt σ, which determines the emergent behaviour of our toy economy. This observation dovetails with
the results reported in [12], where the maximum amount of indebtedness of firms before bankruptcy plays a major
role as well.
A. Role of the debt limit: Macro-level
As a first step towards understanding the influence of σ on the model, we choose a few macroscopic variables:
1. zema is defined as the fraction of agents who do not satisfy the time averaged constraint: pi
ema
µ (t) < σ;
2. z is defined as the fraction of agents that do not satisfy the instantaneous constraint, Eq. (1), at time t.
As σ is reduced (i.e. allowed debt becomes larger), the fraction of unsatisfied agents zema and unsatisfied constraints
in Eq. (1) tend to zero, on average, see Figure 1. This points to the interpretation that, as expected, an increased
debt level lends flexibility to agents and permits them to live another day. However, beyond a certain negative value
of σ (≈ −0.75), we observe that the maximum value attained by zema during the whole time series actually starts
increasing, see Figure 1-b.
To better understand why the maximum of zema increases beyond a certain value of σ, we plot in Figure 2 the time
series for zema for three values of σ. Three distinct behaviors are observed: for positive, or mildly negative values of
σ, the default rate is large. For σ ∼ 0.2, at every time step close to 30% of the agents are being removed at every
step. As σ is reduced, this default rate goes down and for σ = −0.75, a small fraction of the agents are removed at
any time, about 3%. On reducing the value of σ further (∼ −1.6), we observe a clear periodicity in the time series of
zema, with the appearance of regular spikes (which persist forever in the simulation). At the peaks, close to 10% of
the agents are removed from the economy. These oscillations in the rate of bankruptcies is reminiscent of a similar
effect reported in [12] and explained in [14]. We will see below that a similar mechanism is at play here as well.
This suggests the existence of three regimes:
1. Endogenous Crises (EC): this occurs for small values of σ (high levels of allowed debt), σ . −0.75, where
periodic spikes of bankruptcies are observed;
2. Stable Phase (S): this occurs for an intermediate range of debt, −0.75 . σ . −0.25, where the economy reaches
a stationary state characterized by a few bankruptcies;
3. Unstable phase (U): this occurs for positive values of minimal profits σ, where the economy features a high rate
of bankruptcies.
1 Our simulations were in fact done with the lower bound on prices i.e. xm = 0.01 and not zero. This has no material impact on the
present results however.
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FIG. 2: Variation of the fraction of unsatisfied agents zema as a function of time for three values of σ, in the EC
(top), S (middle) and U (bottom) regimes. For σ = −1.6, the agents are removed and replaced periodically whereas
for σ = −0.75, periodicity is lost. In the bottom panel, the σ = 0.2 case corresponding to high-profit is shown.
The behavior for intermediate (S) and low (EC) levels of debt is reminiscent of the self-planting phenomenon
discovered in [32] for a very similar model. In that case, below some critical value σc the dynamics was able to
find a configuration where all constraints (agents) were satisfied, while above σc the dynamics reached a steady-state
value for the fraction of unsatisfied constraints. Differently from [32], however, in the present context the dynamics
is not halted since agents can continue to participate in transactions and update their preferences according to the
movement of the prices.
We also measure the average number of time-steps during which an agent participates in the economy. The results
are shown in Figure 3, where we show how agent lifetimes change and the average number of times an agent is removed
as a function of σ. It is natural to expect that the lifetime of agents is higher when σ is small, since it corresponds to a
7−1.75 −1.50 −1.25 −1.00 −0.75 −0.50 −0.25 0.00 0.25
σ
0
20
40
60
80
〈Lifetimes〉
−1.75 −1.50 −1.25 −1.00 −0.75 −0.50 −0.25 0.00 0.25
σ
0
100
200
300
400
500
600
700
〈Removals〉
FIG. 3: Dependence of agent lifetimes as a function of σ.
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FIG. 4: The demand distributions for different values of σ. We note that in the S regime (middle), the distribution
is bimodal, while in the U regime (right) the distributions remain quasi-Gaussian. In the EC regime (left), the
distribution has a long tail. These distributions are obtained by taking the distribution of the complete demand
time series over all goods.
situation where zema is low on average. Fewer agents are removed in each time-step in this regime (EC or S) and hence
agents participate and live longer. The opposite situation is produced when there is no possibility of debt leading
to the frequent removal of a large fraction of agents which in turn leads to smaller agent lifetimes. The U regime
is characterized by the fact that agents live for not more than 3-4 time-steps, i.e. the timescale of the exponential
moving average ∼ 1/ω = 5. On the contrary, the lifetimes of agents in the EC or S regimes are much larger than the
averaging timescale. In the EC regime, the agent lifetime is comparable to the period of the “business cycle” (i.e. the
period in zema oscillations), which can be of the order of hundreds of time-steps. If a “time-step” is 3 months, this
corresponds to an economic activity lifetime of 25 years.
Having considered how macro indicators behave as a function of σ, we now study how σ influences levels of supply
and demand. The EC and S regimes are characterized by agents persisting for long times with only a few agents
being replaced at any given time step (except during crises in the EC regime). Longer living agents influence the
distributions of the goods being exchanged in the economy. We show how the demand distributions vary as we tune
σ in Figure 4. We observe that for intermediate values of σ = −0.75 in the S regime, the distributions is bimodal.
The bimodality persists for a lower value of σ in the EC regime, with the second peak presenting a heavy right tail.
For positive σ in the U regime, on the other hand, the distribution remains Gaussian, since agents’ preferences are
initially sampled from a normal distribution, and the selection process that biases these preferences does not have
time to operate before agents are replaced.
The rules governing agents’ behaviour also couple the level of supply and demand to the price of goods. In general,
we expect that cheaper goods will be in higher demand (and hence supply) and vice-versa for more expensive goods.
We test this hypothesis in Figure 5, where we show scatter plots of supplies and demands versus prices. We find that,
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FIG. 5: Scatter plot of supply and demand versus the prices of goods. In the first column, we have σ = −1.6 with
supplies and demands concentrated at the extremes, corroborating the bimodal nature of their distributions. The
intermediate case with σ = −0.75 is similar with some goods’ supplies occurring between the two extremes. The last
column shows the case for σ = 0.2 where the supplies and demands are uncorrelated with the prices of the goods.
The color map corresponds to the number of points in a given region.
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FIG. 6: Price distributions for different values of σ, as in Figure 4. These distributions are computed over the
complete time-series of the prices of goods.
as expected, both demand and supply of goods are anti-correlated with their price in the EC and S regimes. In the U
regime, instead, such behavior is not observed: the process of price formations is completely random because agents
fail before being able to adapt their preferences. Figure 5 also shows the signature of the bimodality of the demand
and supply distributions in the EC and S regimes. This is confirmed by the observation that the price distribution is
bimodal as well, as shown in Figure 6.
Hence, our model generates three well distinct regimes. The U regime is somehow pathological: agents are replaced
immediately after their introduction, hence their preferences are completely random and unable to adapt, and prices
are also random, as a consequence. On the contrary, in the EC and S regimes, agents remain in the economy long
enough to be able to adapt their prices. In the EC regime, we observe periodic spikes of bankruptcies during which all
agents are replaced; the agents’ lifetime is then comparable to the periodicity of crises. In the S regimes, agents are
replaced at a constant but very low rate. In both cases, one observes what could be called a “speciation” of goods.
While all goods are a priori equivalent, the system self-organizes in such a way to create two categories of goods:
cheap goods in high demand on the one hand, and expensive goods in low demand on the other. Note however that
since this speciation is endogenous to the dynamics, it is also temporary: goods switch from one group to the other
with time. The details of this dynamical process is what we examine next.
90 250 500 750 1000 1250 1500 1750
Time
0
1000
2000
D
em
an
d
0 250 500 750 1000 1250 1500 1750
Time
200
400
600
800
D
em
an
d
0 250 500 750 1000 1250 1500 1750
Time
300
400
D
em
an
d
FIG. 7: Time series of the demand of three random goods for three values of σ. Top: σ = −1.6 (EC regime) where
we have cyclical rise and fall in demand. Middle: σ = −0.75 (S regime) where goods can switch from having high
demand to having low demand (and vice-versa). As one good demand falls, another low-demand good takes over.
Bottom: σ = 0.2 (U regime) where no coherent trend is found.
B. Role of the debt limit: Dynamics
The study of macroscopic observables has demonstrated that σ is a key control parameter which drives the system
through three distinct regimes. We now turn to an analysis of the influence of σ on the dynamics of our toy economy.
We begin by observing how the demand of individual goods varies with time in these three regimes. In Figure 7 we
show time-series of the demand of three randomly chosen goods for three values of σ. In the EC regime, we observe
that the demand level of the goods is also periodic. This is a consequence of the existence of periodic crashes: as a
large number of agents are periodically removed, the corresponding demand for goods also undergoes periodic swings.
Interestingly, goods with low demand are out of phase with goods with high demand. In the U regime (σ = 0.2), the
demand for goods fluctuates around an average value, within ∼ ±10%. This follows the behaviour observed in the
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FIG. 8: Understanding the switch from high to low demand of a good. Left column: The individual trajectories of
the preferences of agents who are buyers (top) and sellers (bottom) is shown. The removal of an agent is shown by
an abrupt jump or fall in the preference. Right column: The total supply and demand for the good (top) and its
price (bottom) are shown. The black dotted line is the point when pi > 1.
zema time-series as well: a significant proportion of agents is removed at each time step and hence the level of demand
remains stable around its average. For the intermediate S regime (σ = −0.75), the situation is quite complex. The
demand for individual goods shows large variations: one good might start with high demand before being replaced by
another good, within rather short time intervals. This suggests that the goods that are present in the two peaks of the
bimodal distribution of demands (Figure 4) are not the same but keep changing in time. We indeed observe that goods
keep switching from the right peak (high demand) to the left peak (low demand) dynamically, while maintaining the
bimodal character of the distributions globally intact. A similar scenario with endogenous switches is found in [40]:
firms compete among themselves to gain market share with boundedly rational consumers choosing firms to maximise
their utility. This interaction leads to firms dynamically exchanging positions of monopoly with each other.
As a means of understanding the dynamical switching between goods in the EC regime, we consider the case of a
particular good whose demand (and hence supply) falls. A preliminary observation we make is that the behavioral
rules for the agents imply that as soon as the price of a good becomes high (greater than 1), then agents will reduce
their demand. Hence, we expect that as soon as the price of a good reaches 1, we will observe a fall in demand, which
will lead to a fall in supply. The fall in supply in turn will produce a further rise in prices since sellers will seek to
maintain their previous profit levels at reduced demand. This increase in price feeds back into suppressed demand
and this feedback loop leads to a rapid collapse. This situation is indeed borne out in the data as shown in Figure 8.
In the left column, we show how agents reduce their demand and how supply follows in lockstep. At the aggregate
level, we observe the rapid fall of the supply and demand of the good as soon as pi > 1 (right column top).
Still, two questions remain open. The first question is: what factors lead to the initial price increase of the good
itself? We observe in Figure 8 that the price continues to increase for a certain number of time-steps before reaching
pi = 1. This increase in price can be understood by the failure of big buyers of the good. Producers of this good then
face reduced demand and hence must lower production according to Eq. (4). The prices then have to adjust upwards
since producers have to satisfy their budget constraint at a lower scale of production. The second question is: what
precipitates the failure of a big buyer or big seller? To understand this better, we define a quantity called the f -index:
f sellersi (t) =
∑
µ
ξiµ(t) Θ(ξ
i
µ(t)) Θ
(
σ − piemaµ (t+ 1)
)
,
fbuyersi (t) =
∑
µ
|ξiµ(t)|Θ(−ξiµ(t)) Θ
(
σ − piemaµ (t+ 1)
)
.
(9)
Thus the f -index computes the decrease in supply or demand for a good due to the agents who will go bankrupt in
the next step. We measure the correlation of the f -index with the change in prices. The average of this correlation
over all goods is shown in Figure 9. We observe that for both buyers and sellers the correlations are peaked at τ = 1.
The positive correlation observed for buyers suggests that an increase in the price of goods is accompanied with the
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all the goods.
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FIG. 10: Top: piemaµ time-series for σ = −1.6 is shown for 20 agents. The dark black line is the average value of piµ at
which agents are re-injected. Bottom: zema (in black) with a moving integral of zema showing that during the crash
almost all agents are removed and replaced.
removal of buyers in the next time step. On the other hand, the correlation for sellers is negative implying that a
reduction in the prices corresponds to the sellers being removed.
We thus conclude that purely random fluctuations in the price of a good can engender, though a feedback loop, the
failure of sellers and buyers and produce the peculiar dynamics observed in the middle panel of Figure 7. One might
argue that this is due to the myopic nature of our agents and the strategy they use. This might well be; on the other
hand, it is difficult to bet the stability of the economy on the purported rationality of agents.
We now move to the dynamics of individual agents. For sufficiently small values of σ, in the EC regime, we have
observed that zema is cyclical: a significant fraction of the agents are removed during crashes, which cover about 10-20
time-steps separated by periods with low removal rates. In the top panel of Figure 10 we show the piemaµ time-series
for 20 randomly chosen agents. We observe that those agents who are well above their threshold and with disparate
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FIG. 11: Variation of the change in the profits piemaµ averaged over all remaining agents following the removal of an
agent plotted against zema. Two distinct cases are shown, τ = 1 and τ = 2 corresponding to changes in the profit of
surviving agents one time-step or two time-steps after the removal of agents. Left: ∆piµema against zema computed
over the complete evolution of the economy. Right: Zoom of ∆piµema for small values of zema.
budgets are nevertheless removed together during a crash. Furthermore, the lower panel of Figure 10 shows that over
one period of the cycle almost all the agents are removed and replaced.
The mechanism leading to the cyclical behavior can be understood via the feedback that exists between the failure
of agents and the profit trajectories of the agents. As discussed in [14], a biased random walk along with an absorbing
boundary condition and re-injections can under certain conditions lead to synchronized crisis waves. In our case, we
observe that the removal of an agent produces a small but systematic reduction in piemaµ for all the other surviving
agents – i.e. the failure of one agent fragilises the rest of the community. This is exactly the mechanism at the origin
of synchronisation mechanism discussed in [14], leading to periodic crises of fully endogenous nature.
In order to provide support to this interpretation, in Figure 11, we plot the change in profits ∆piµema = pi
µ
ema(t+τ)−
piµema(t) against the fraction of agents removed zema at each time-step. This shows that the average (over surviving
agents) change in profits is nearly always negative for the surviving agents and this is true irrespective of the number
of agents removed, even when small (see Figure 11, right). It is quite satisfying to see that the mechanism at play in
a very different ABM, namely “Mark0” [12], appears in another guise in the present context.
IV. CONCLUSION
In this work we presented a prototype agent-based model with a budgetary constraint at its core. Our basic
assumption is that preferences (i.e. supply and demand) cannot adapt immediately, but with a lag. The market, on
the other hand, provides the best set of prices given the budget constraints. These budgetary constraints lead us to
interpret the economy as a constraint satisfaction problem (CSP) – given agents’ preferences and their budgets, what
configuration of prices achieves maximal “satisfaction”?
We restricted in this paper to the simplest case where the global constraint on prices is linear, fixing the average
price to unity. This means that the CSP is, at each time step, convex and its solution unique. Other, non-linear
constraints could be envisaged and would probably generate an even richer phenomenology due to the existence of
a large number of equilibria [31, 32]. But even the simplest specification of the model leads to very interesting (and
sometimes unexpected) features, such as spontaneous speciation of goods, or waves of synchronized bankruptcies.
We have found that the model exhibits three regimes as a function of the amount of debt that each agent can
accumulate before defaulting. At high debt (strongly negative σ), we observe the appearance of endogenous cycles
during which the economy goes from a state of stability with very few bankruptcies to a state with a high bankruptcy
rate. Lowering the allowed debt (increasing σ) takes the model to a regime where the economy is stable with very low
bankruptcy rate and no aggregate-level crises. In this regime, the system self-organizes in a way such to create two
categories of goods: cheap goods in high demand on the one hand, and expensive goods in low demand on the other.
Goods switch from one category to the other with time. These switches are triggered by random fluctuations, but
when they occur, a feedback loop accelerates the transition and generates abrupt “crashes”, when favored products
quickly lose their luster.
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Finally, there is a low debt or high required profit regime (positive σ) where the bankruptcy rate is extremely high
with a large fraction of the agents going bankrupt at every time step. In other words, in this regime agents never
have time to adapt and the economy remains structure-less.
We have shown that the emergence of waves of defaults in the endogenous crisis regime is triggered by the same
mechanism as the one proposed in [14], namely the degradation of the balance sheet of surviving agents when one
agent goes under. This mechanism is, we believe, very general and is likely to be present in many real world situations
(see [12, 14] and [41] for recent mathematical developments. See also [42] for a general framework to understand
synchronization within endogenously created business cycles).
Following the crisis of 2008, the issue of credit expansion and its effects on the economy has found centerstage in
macroeconomics. There is now increasing evidence that financial crises are preceded by protracted periods of credit
expansion. Empirically, it has been observed that the higher the private debt buildup, the deeper is the downturn [43].
Both ABM and standard DSGE approaches have sought to understand the details of the leverage cycle: Ref. [44]
studies the leverage of financial entities intermediating between households and industry. They conclude that increased
leverage does lead to increased output but at the cost of systemic risk. Aymanns and co-authors build an agent-based
model to uncover the dynamics of the leverage cycle based on the risk perception of actors like banks [45, 46]. They
propose a detailed study underlying the importance of managing leverage systematically to dampen endogenously
created debt-driven boom-bust cycles. Importantly, they find sustainable levels of leverage exceeding which the
dynamics becomes unstable and chaotic.
Our present model confirms the central role that debt levels play in the stability of the economy: too high a debt
level and we have periodic crises, too low a debt level and the agents cannot sustain themselves long enough for
long-lived structures to appear and survive. Our work presents a break from previous studies on the leverage cycle by
coupling the production output and trading within the economy with agents’ budgetary constraints. Since agents in
our model get credit for free, an interesting direction for future exploration is the introduction of a bank (or banking
sector) to set a price for borrowing through the interest rate.
Finally, let us reiterate our belief that the CSP paradigm will, in due course, play an important role in economics.
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